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Recently, there has been a lot of talk about consumer empowerment through new information and 
communication technologies. Corporate captains of marketing, Wired Magazine’s neo-libertarian techno-
utopians, marketing consultants of the digital economy and many marketing academics agree that we all 
have more choices, more information, more entertainment, more transparency, and lower prices thanks to 
Amazon, Facebook, Youtube, and all the rest.  We are liberated from the burdens of material ownership, 
free to access digital objects and services in ways that satisfy our needs in highly targeted and efficient 
ways. The empowerment through technology chorus is so loud and cohesive that we generally take the 
message for granted. And in some limited respect, consumers may feel empowered when shopping on 
Amazon.com or in the malls with their iPhones on hand. But let us be very clear about the idea of 
empowerment that is promoted by the cheerleaders of what Jodi Dean (2005) calls communicative 
capitalism. Real empowerment, so much should be clear, will never be “granted” to consumers by those 
in economic (and thus political) power. In the final analysis – and putting aside for a moment the fact that 
even empowered consumers are still interpellated first and foremost as subjects of consumption – the 
ideal of the empowered consumer (rational, enlightened, informed, restrained, un-manipulable) is 
completely antithetical to the needs of capital and the marketing regime within consumer capitalism. 
Therefore, any call for actual consumer empowerment would automatically be a radical demand and an 
insurgent claim aimed at undermining and replacing capital’s power to dominate the consumer totally. In 
the end, it is important to recognize that any technology employed by marketing today becomes a 
technology of enclosure (even if never completely successful), which permits empowerment only in a 
version sanction by capital. That is why marketing (and capital more generally [see Lazzarato, 2004]) 
today is biopolitical. It wants to govern life completely while appearing to not govern at all.   
 
In this chapter we argue that new technologies in contemporary marketing management are best thought 
of as technologies of enclosure. On the one hand, marketing encloses the subject as individualized and 
individuated consumer. On the other, marketing aims to enclose (ie., capture, make proprietary, 
appropriate) what is common or collectively produced or cherished by individuals as inalienable 
expressions of personal identity and agency. At the same time that marketing encloses, it operates 
ideologically, although not in the classical Marxist sense of creating a false consciousness. Rather, the 
challenge for marketers is to enclose and capture the subject and the common while appearing not to do 
any of these things. By accepting as non-ideological terms such as choice, identity, fulfillment, 
empowerment, enrichment, collaboration, creativity and so on, marketers and consumers alike choose to 
believe, just as anyone sensible would believe, that new techniques and technologies of enclosure are 
really just good marketing practice aimed at value creation and delivery, not customer domination and 
exploitation.   
We should remember that an atmosphere of distrust has accompanied the development of marketing from 
the beginning and marketers have long been suspected of being professional manipulators, devising 
salacious techniques and technologies with which to incite, manipulate and exploit consumer desire and 
anxiety. As Packard put it fifty years ago, “[T]hese depth manipulators are in their operations beneath the 
surface of conscious life, starting to acquire a power of persuasion that is becoming a matter of justifiable 
public scrutiny and concern” (1957, pp. 9-10). More recent popular indictments of marketing include 
Adam Curtis’s documentaries on The Century of the Self, Naomi Klein’s No Logo (2000), and the BBC 
series The Men Who Makes Us Spend (presented by Jacques Peretti).  
Criticism of marketers is compounded by widespread consumer cynicism regarding the genuineness of 
marketing messages (see Gabriel and Lang, 1995). Interestingly, the emerging generation of online 
marketers– typically referred to as digital or social media marketers – see marketing’s crisis of legitimacy 
directly tied to what it considers the corporate, top-down marketing methods devised in the 1970s and 
1980s and designed to discipline and control consumers. For a new generation of tech-savvy marketers, 
imbued with a solid dose of techno-libertarian ideals of independence and a frontier mentality that rejects 
top-down authority and bureaucracy in favor of self-organizing systems, radical autonomy and freely 
collaborative networks, a dramatic shift in mindset was needed in the age of participatory media and Big 
Data. In a radical turn propagated, for example, by prominent social media marketing experts like Solis 
(2010) and Stratten (2010), marketing has to be ‘un’-done. The term ‘un-marketing’ rises to prominence 
in the consulting literature and offers a reframing of marketing that rejects corporate-controlled top-down 
techniques, and favours horizontal, collaborative, and participatory customer engagement (Kutcher, 2010, 
Stratten, 2010, 2014). In this context, the idea of online customer communities gains popularity because it 
provides a fantasy of restructuring marketplace relations according to principles of co-creation, 
sovereignty, equality, and sharing. More recently, what we call Big Data marketing is framed according 
to similar registers where data magnetizes consumers and marketers to a shared ethos of the “opt-in” 
economy (Godin, 1999). Big Data marketers – at least in the version propagated by Google’s Hal Varian, 
for example – pose innocuously enough as personal recommendation and consulting agents for consumers 
who in return for giving up personal information receive ever more relevant, valuable, and desired 
information, goods and services (Zuboff, 2015). Who would not like such a deal that appears to be based 
on liberal ideals of good intentions on all sides and the equal distribution of costs and benefits, even as 
companies manage communities and customer data not on behalf of consumers but on behalf of corporate 
profit.  
In sum, new marketing technologies – from blogs to communities to surveillance-based collaborative 
filtering and recommender systems – no matter how invasive, ever-present and insidious, have been 
framed by technology-driven marketers as democratizing and equalizing forces reshaping the 
contemporary marketplace in favor of the consumer. Customer and brand communities are happy places 
of collaboration and collective value creation governed by an ethos of mutual respect, sharing and 
dispersed control.  Big Data Marketing, which aspires to intensifying consumer surveillance and control 
(Zuboff, 2015), is often presented as part of the contemporary ethos of collaborative ‘in-this-together-
ness’ and collective support structures between companies and consumers. Marketers are asked to employ 
Big Data to better understand, assist, support and connect with customers; the technology magnetizing 
both exchange parties to a fantasy of better products, better choices, better experiences, better prices, 
better service and generally happier lives. To live in a world where companies strain to innovate and 
please consumers, all we need to do in return is give companies complete access to our personal 
information. Such a request makes sense to a generation of marketing professionals and consumers that 
have grown up with Google, Facebook and Amazon tracking its every move.  
In the next section we explore critically new marketing technologies such as online customer 
communities and Big Data, and possession of digital objects as consumer lock in. .We suggest that these 
technologies are technologies of Biopolitical Marketing. They aspire to enclose all forms of life for profit. 
We suggest that marketing innovation is now structured according to the imperative of biopolitical 
marketing: the making, valorizing and enclosing of all forms and expressions of life.   
Online Community Marketing 
 
We should have no illusions about the new marketers of the social media age, what meme hustler Tim 
O’Reilly (Morozov, 2013) has termed Web 2.0.  As these ‘un-marketers’ replace the disciplinary 
technologies of marketing with technologies of communitarian self-governance, two-way communication 
and collaboration, new contradictions emerge characteristic of communicative capitalism. Specifically, 
even a community of autonomous, creative, collaborative and networked participants must be 
commercially exploited– this is, after all, still marketing’s raison d’être. Social media marketers 
understand this practical challenge of commodifying communicatively structured social relations that do 
not want to be commodified. Or, to put it another way, marketers must enclose the space where 
production of reproduction of the common takes place (Cvijanovic, Vercellone, and Fumagalli, 2010; 
Hardt and Negri, 2009). The trick is to privatize without disrupting what Dyer-Witheford (2009) calls the 
circuit of the common, where collectives or associations of people “organise shared, common resources 
including creativity, machinery and resources into productive ensembles that create more commons which 
in turn provide the basis for new associations.”  
Mastering the paradox of on the one hand enabling, and enabling sharing of, human creativity and 
cognitive production owned by no one and on the other exploiting the work of the many for the benefit of 
the few requires the ‘correct marketing mind-set.’ Internet marketing consultant Tamar Weinberg (2009, 
pp. 52-53) articulates this tension in unmistakable terms:  
Later, your ‘ulterior motive’ can be communicated (just as long as you continue giving back to 
the community and its members look up to you as a respected contributor), but it’s more 
important to establish yourself as a reputable member who wants to give back to the community 
first. Once you do, you can begin to take, as long as the community is receptive and wants to 
know more about you as a community participant, but you should always keep giving.  
There is something revealing about the frantic back and forth between the double exhortation to keep 
giving and making sure to ‘take’. The new technologies of marketing render give-and-take immediate and 
necessary. Weinberg understands that marketing must take, but that it must do so without appearing to 
take (by also giving back). There is no cynicism or element of conscious deception at work when new 
marketers talk about the riches to be found in the common spaces of the wild Web 2.0.  Rather, marketers 
of the digital age really do believe that when the new commons of communicative capitalism produce 
creative and cognitive value it belongs to them as much as to anyone else. To extract communicative 
surplus value from the community marketers must adopt a ‘commun-ist sensibility’ (Zwick and 
Bradshaw, 2016). As actor-cum-social media consultant Ashton Kutcher puts it (Solis, 2010, p. ix):  
The roles are reversing and individuals and brands have the ability to reach and rouse powerful 
and dedicated communities without ever having to pay for advertising. I’m just part of a bigger 
movement of empowering the people who care enough to change the world. Social media is 
socalising causes and purpose and inciting nothing short of a revolution.”  
At the heart of this utopian conception of communal marketing is the idea of a perfect communion with 
consumers based on a sincere belief that ‘we all want the same thing’. From this vantage point, 
appropriating for corporate profit the affective, communicative and cognitive work of communities is 
entirely justified, if not required if marketers are to hold up their end of the bargain and deliver all the 
good things they promise in return for this appropriation.  
A neo-libertarian impulse defines the enthusiasm of Kutcher, Solis and others (see e.g. Rubel in Miller, 
2008; Downes and Mui, 2000). Consumer community marketing is imagined as the logical extension of 
the cyber-utopian project in which horizontality, anti-authority, and bottom-up power facilitate 
entrepreneurialism, value creation, and innovation. Representative of the neo-libertarian narrative is 
Kevin Kelly’s (2009) enthusiastic announcement of the arrival of a ‘global collectivist society’ which, he 
argued, amounts to a ‘New Socialism.’ This socialism is ‘not class warfare. It is not anti-American; 
indeed digital socialism may be the newest American innovation.’ The irony is that the revolutionary 
socialism envisioned by Kelly propagates both self-organising and entrepreneurial commons and 
successful privatization of the common. 
Within the communal ethos of digital socialism, marketing transforms into the enactment of consensual 
partnership with consumers who are no longer controlled but invited by the corporation as equals in the 
joint-task of co-creation. Hence, practices that control consumers, or absorb them into centralised, 
technocratic, and rationalised structures appear crude, abusive, and anachronistic. Instead, under 
conditions of communicative capitalism, marketing must try to enclose the multitude while maintaining 
the conditions under which the multitude labors cognitively and creatively (see e.g. Fournier and Lee, 
2009; Schau, et al., 2009; Weinberg, 2009). For O’Dwyer, this perspective imagines the web as a “virtual 
communism”; an “immaterial space that trades in knowledge and culture, at once free from commercial 
subjugation and conversely capable of exerting influence on the material substrate of capital” (O’Dwyer, 
2013, p. 498).  
 
Hence the communism of Web 2.0, as described by Kleiner and Wyrick (2007), is one where companies 
retain ownership of content, while opening up a method of content creation. The popular narrative of Web 
2.0 as a democratising force that brings emancipatory empowerment occludes how, as Stallabrass (2012) 
informs, peer-to-peer systems had previously allowed users control of the frame as well as the content. 
Therefore, Web 2.0 is an enclosure of a commons and not the other way around. It is in this context that 
capital wants to harness this commonist ethos in what are in effect privatised spheres (see also Arvidsson 
and Peitersen, 2013; Beverungen et al., 2013). 
 The tension that arises from marketers’ pursuit of new modes of commodification versus the multitude’s 
productive value that depends on remaining untouched by the institutional logic of marketing becomes 
acutely visible in the context of participatory media. Social media marketers like Solis and Weinberg 
warn that the productive anarchy of the crowd is a statement against institutions, discipline and 
commercial enclosure. These authors announce that exciting new online activities such as prosumption, 
peer collaboration, co-creation and crowd sourcing clearly show that consumers do not need – and likely 
do not want – marketers in the picture. Enclosure of the commons for the benefit of the firm therefore 
requires marketing techniques and technologies that recruit consumers into value production in a way that 
appears voluntary and free. Resolving this contradiction becomes the challenge and, in their search for 
innovative ways of commodifying the crowd without antagonism, marketers turn towards customer 
communities.   
Big Data Marketing 
 
The customer community is just one example of a technological innovation that is motivated by, 
consciously or not, resolving this contradiction of marketing under communicative capitalism. Database-
driven marketing, or what we call here Big Data marketing, represents another such technology. The 
challenge of studying Big Data marketing from a cultural and critical theory perspective is to move 
beyond the immediate urge to focus on the technology’s intensification of consumer surveillance and 
control (e.g. Zuboff, 2015) and instead recognize that Big Data is fundamentally motivated and sustained 
by its ability to generate and enclose value immanent to consumer life. Thus, while very different in 
technique and operation, Big Data marketing shares with community marketing that it is a technology of 
biopolitical marketing.    
 
Business sociologist Shoshana Zuboff (2015) suggests the term surveillance capitalism to describe what 
she calls the logic of creating, collecting, manipulating and, most importantly, valorizing information. She 
argues, as indeed others have before (e.g. Arvidsson, 2005; Lury, 2004; Zwick and Denegri-Knott, 2009), 
that today the goal of many technology companies – in fact, increasingly any company because there is a 
sense that all companies are becoming technology, or at least information companies – is not to produce 
products or services based on some identified customer need.  Instead, companies aim to build what we 
could call platforms of co-production where consumers do things they want to do and for that privilege 
they either have to pay the platform provider a fee or they have to pay in other ways (micro transaction, 
eyeballs/data that can be resold, etc.). If the business model is based on information value, the goal is to 
capture as much information about the users of the platform as possible and then find ways to repackage 
and commodify this information for a buyer. 
  
The hope is that the more data can be collected and analyzed the more money can be made.  This is one 
reason why data-monitoring technologies are so wide-spread and continue to spread. Taking Google’s 
chief economist Hal Varian’s exposition of Google’s business model Zuboff develops the notion of 
surveillance (or Google) capitalism. Varian characterizes Google’s business vision as founded on four 
pillars, the first one speaks directly to the idea of Big Data: “More data extraction and analysis.” Varian 
explains how most of the data today is generated via computer-mediated interactions and how all our 
interactions with machines are recorded and logged for possible mining and analysis. In addition, there is 
the data generated by the internet of everything. Finally, governments and other non-commercial 
bureaucratic agencies and groups collect and store data, which is linked to the internet and can be used for 
analysis.  
 
Zuboff is correct to point out, as others have before (e.g. Fuchs, 2010, 2012; Juergenson, 2010), that data 
generation, collection and use is based on asymmetrical power relations. Google owns us and our future a 
lot more than we own Google and its future (Lanier, 2013). The common response by commentators and 
analysts such as Zuboff to Google’s “More data extraction and analysis” doctrine is to focus on Google’s 
desire for a totally knowable and known world of people, markets, goods, and services and their flows. 
From this perspective, Big Data becomes a matter of privacy invasion, universal surveillance and 
neoliberal forms of government. However, from the perspective of biopolitical marketing we recognize 
that Big Data becomes a technique of capture, appropriation and enclosure. Surveillance capitalism is thus 
not so much the end of privacy as another expression of marketing’s desire to appropriate value from 
consumers without antagonizing them. The surveillance infrastructure is after all rather passive and the 
process of marketing based on Big Data not always very obvious or intrusive. However, Big Data desires 
to not only know reality but shape it. It is this aspect of Big Data marketing that makes it biopolitical and 
therefore so much more problematic than the analytical registers of privacy and surveillance suggest.  
 
On this point, Zuboff’s analysis of surveillance capitalism is instructive because Zuboff sees in the 
continuous experimental marketing interventions the potential for what she calls reality mining (see also 
Zwick and Denegri-Knott, 2009). The idea behind reality mining is that with experimentation researchers, 
businesses and what she somewhat vaguely calls the technological infrastructure can capture what people 
do at all times but also alter behavior, then capture again, then alter again and recaptured and so on. What 
is real and what is the outcome of real-time techno-cybernetic manipulation becomes indistinguishable 
(see also Elmer, 2004). It is through this recursive process that marketing aims to constitute not merely 
consumer subjects and identities but entire modes of being, or as Lazzarato (2004) puts it, entire worlds of 
capital-life.   
 
Digital possessions and consumer enclosure 
 
Marketing technologies of enclosure have morphed into lock in systems that both valorise and operate 
through consumers’ psychic and financial investment in transforming digital objects into personally 
meaningful possessions.  Within these digital enclosures, consumers own attempts to incorporate 
homogenous digital commodities into the domain of private possession end up facilitating their own 
entrapment (Molesworth, Watkins and Denegri-Knott, 2016). This enclosure also has the potential to 
amputate consumers from their digital possessions in ways that reduce a digital object’s social utility and 
capacity to help develop and express personal identity.  This mutation in technologies of enclosure not 
only diminishes the public domain as already noted (see Benkler, 2000; Lessig 1999) but also undermines 
the liberal ideals legitimising enclosing technologies themselves (see Denegri-Knott and Tadajewski 
2010; Denegri-Knott and Tadajewski, 2016).  Both classical and neo-libertarianism promote the idea that 
private goods are closely linked to our individuality in that the sense of control and privacy afforded by 
them allow us to develop and embody our personality as acts of self-actualization and will (Hegel 1821 in 
Gauss, 1994; Demsetz, 1967; Munzer 1990, Snare, 1972). It follows that it is only fair that those who 
invest themselves in transforming an object should have ownership rights over it (Demsetz, 1967; Locke 
1988 [1689]; Munzer 1990; Snare, 1972).  However, the right to full private property central to the neo-
libertarian project legitimating high tech companies’ rights to benefit from their investments in the digital 
economies is denied to consumers.  Full property rights are often cited as paramount in conferring objects 
with an important role in helping people develop a sense of self and establishing and strengthening 
alliances between them. Hence technologies of enclosure fence in both public and private domains. 
 
As a project of enclosure, these technologies operate by erecting proprietary walls around what 
consumers deem as their digital possessions.  In doing so, they erode rights safeguarded by private 
ownership. Outright, total ownership, understood as ‘exclusive rights of use and exploitation, to possess, 
manage, receive income from, power to transfer, exclude and abandon’ (Snare 1972), it is claimed, is 
redundant within the context of digital consumption.   Digital objects are complex entities that generally 
include code, software, hardware, Internet infrastructures and end user license agreements (EULAs) in 
order to be enacted and experienced as targets of consumption activity (Molesworth and Watkins, 2014; 
Watkins et al., 2016).  Digital objects, like our e-books, playlists, social media posts, our Instagram 
pictures and video game purchases and prizes, in their material lightness are celebrated as both needs 
satisfying and liberating. Provided they are readily accessible they are likely candidates for communal 
sharing, (Belk 2013a, 2013b; Bardhi and Eckhardt, 2012; Bardhi et al., 2012), short term access, and good 
exemplars of liquid possessions- malleable and vaporous enough to fulfil consumers’ functional and 
situational needs to suit shifting identity projects (Bardhi et al. 2012) without the obligations and 
responsibilities associated with ownership (Bardhi et al. 2012; Rifkin, 2000).  As Rifkin  (2000) notes, in 
a digitised, hyper speed network economy, ownership of physical capital ‘becomes increasingly marginal’ 
and access, primary source of value for both access providers and their users. Ownership again, is seen by 
Rifkin (2002) as too cumbersome and slow to keep up with the speed of delivery offered by Internet 
enabled platforms; instead of being burdened by ownership it pays to ‘be always connected to a steady 
stream of just in time experiences.’  
 
For these just in time experiences  ‘to pay’ consumers need to ‘pay’ to access their digital objects. Digital 
objects are in effect rented rather than fully owned, because they require continuous investment of time, 
money and other resources in order to be accessed. Even pay-per-download digital objects once saved 
onto a password-protected account, like iTunes or Amazon’s Kindle, become entangled with a firm’s 
proprietary system limiting consumers’ ability to transfer accumulated objects to a friend or family 
member (Denegri-Knott, 2015; Watkins et al., 2016). There are even lingering attachments between firms 
and consumers in situations where payment is not required.  For example, though there is no direct 
monetary exchange between consumers and Facebook, Wordpress or YouTube, possession can be 
interrupted; digital objects may become lost or corrupted at any time.  And here lies the paradox. Access 
is marketed as providing exactly what it denies: access.  Note for example how subscription based 
services like Spotify are marketed on the premise that there are ‘No More Limits’ (Spotify News, 2014), 
or Amazonkindle’s ‘Bought Once, Read Everywhere’ (Wired, 2011) promise. Areas of access themselves 
are branded as ‘my areas’; the music you curate with Spotify as a freemium customer is accessed in a 
menu entitled ‘your music’. Bloggers and vlogers have ‘their areas’, ‘their posts’, ‘their content’. The 
language of enclosure is nurturing and reassuring. It is the language of freedom and empowerment. It 
invites consumers to engage with digital objects as if they were theirs. 
 
Reference to Igor Kopytoff’s (1986) influential work on commodity biographies offers a useful entry 
point to see how digital possessions can operate as technologies of enclosure. Kopytoff’s premise is that 
commodities are defined quantitatively and in relation to other commodities. Their tendency for 
proliferation is spearheaded by a commoditizing impulse, limited only by what ‘the exchange technology 
permits’ (Kopytoff, 1986, p. 87). On the other hand, singular possessions are defined qualitatively in 
terms to their relationship to cultural categories and personal histories. In that way, they are driven and 
defined by cultural and individual requirements to classify, discern and sacralise. In Kopytoff’s proposed 
continuum between sacred, singularised objects and homogenised commodities, moving commodities 
from their market sphere into the domain of personal possession requires self-investment (Belk et al. 
1989; McCracken 1986; Richins, 1994; Wallendorf and Arnould 1988). This includes work on meanings 
that attach an object to another person, a time or place (Csíkszentmihályi and Rochberg-Halton, 1981) or 
work on customizing, cleaning, repairing, displaying to create and maintain the preferential status of a 
meaningful or sacred possession (Belk et al., 1989).   
 
Digital objects however cannot be transitioned so easily.  Like their material equivalents, digital 
possessions that are experienced as meaningful are so because they have become focal points of 
psychological attention and investment over time (Denegri-Knott et al. 2012). Consider the time spent 
curating the perfect Spotify playlist or in winning trophies accumulated in game play. These digital 
objects have been in effect, to borrow from Csíkszentmihályi and Rochberg-Halton (1981), cultivated 
with focused attention and thus becoming meaningful possessions. Focused attention is expended in 
harnessing objects to help achieve a goal- for instance harvesting a character in a video game to help 
complete missions or in storing them to help protect their sacred status (Belk et al., 1989; 
Csíkszentmihályi and Rochberg-Halton 1981; Fournier, 1998; McCracken 1986; Richins, 1994). This 
investment produces relationships of attachment, where objects are not defined by their exchangeability to 
other things only, but rather by their qualitative relationship to personal histories (Belk, 1988) and cultural 
categories (Kopytoff, 1986).  
 
Yet, in the case of digital objects, they are never too far from their market origins. In fact digital objects 
come to inhabit multiple positions, both as objects of personal significance and assets for the firms that 
help create and host them. In this way they are quasi possessions (see Denegri-Knott, 2015) or 
commodity-possession hybrids. This hybridity is well illustrated in Google’s music streaming service, 
Google Play Music, with the service pitched as a combination of ‘your collection and our catalogue’ (The 
Guardian, 2016). As hybrids, singularising processes are equally commoditising, inasmuch as they are 
supported by market exchange. Differently put, commodity-possession hybrids are defined by 
singularising action that does not severe links to the market, because that action often enrols firm 
resources to cultivate their possession and because the hosting firm arbitrates access.  Thus the more a 
consumer invests in crafting the perfect playlist on Spotify, the more reluctant she will be do abandon the 
service. The same applies to social media.  Thus, processes of singularisation that are meant to strip 
objects from their commodity status are more market entangling, than severing (see Molesworth et al. 
2016).   
 
 
This creates an unusual situation, where possession becomes precarious and unstable. Consumers, having 
formed attachments to their digital objects continue to be entangled in on-going commercial relationships 
in ways that reconfigure supposedly inalienable possessions into technologies of enclosure that also 
happen valorise consumers’ investments. If a consumer wants continued access to a favourite playlist or 
digital object, they will have to either continue to pay or at the very least engage with the hosting firm.  In 
doing this, they help accrue profits for companies hosting their digital possessions.  For example, users of 
social media make significant contributions in enhancing the social utility of the networking sites they 
use, and therefore also their exchange value. The benefits for Facebook, and MMORGs are obvious: 
consumers are locked into using platforms that host their meaningful digital possessions, and hosting 
companies benefit financially through monetising strategies facilitating access, either directly or through 
the sale of advertising. Consumers may also be subject to further monetising attempts from companies 
seeking to profit from their attachment to their digital possessions. To illustrate, when Facebook decided 
to delete photographs synched from users’ phones to Facebook to encourage the adoption of their new 
Moments App, it was consumers’ attachment to their accumulated photographs that catapulted the app 
into the top 100 free Android and iOS apps in the UK, and made it the third most popular free app on iOS 
(The Guardian, 2016).  
 
Possessions as technologies of enclosure also diminish an object’s social utility in ways that reduce 
consumers’ freedom to control their own possessions. . Objects that are gifted, lent, shared and 
bequeathed fulfil important social functions- they can help establish and strengthen bonds of affiliation 
and reciprocity between people (Douglas and Isherwood, 1970; McCracken, 1986).  Because full 
ownership of rights can be denied by EULAs, movement of digital objects may be unlikely. Take for 
instance limitations on gifting, re-selling and bequeathing imposed on many digital objects, and compare 
them to the rich biographies of fully owned material consumption objects:  Amazon applies its own DRM 
to Kindle eBooks, meaning they cannot be accessed via other devices, Apple uses its FairPlay DRM to 
files that are purchased from the iBookstore limiting opportunities to share and lend. World of Warcraft’s 
terms as conditions prohibits the selling, or trading of gifting of an account (Blizzard, 2016); iTunes 
collections cannot be lent, shared or bequeathed. There are no legal second hand markets for digital 
goods. In this way digital objects may be described as ‘terminal commodities’ (Appadurai, 1986). 
Similarly without the sanction of legal ownership, possession is fragile.   
 
Only full ownership guarantees exclusive and future use over a possession, and thus the lack of this 
guarantee, limits our sense of freedom and independence.  As Rudmin (1998) argues, failure to guarantee 
future use produces an unstable, precarious possession. Without the guarantees that total legal ownership 
provides, digital possession is precarious because it is prone to be disrupted or terminated at any time.  
Such disruptions threaten the very fabric of possession as an anchor for the development of the self and 
social linking, in that its objectual characteristics are no longer permanence and stability (Molesworth et 
al. 2016). This also undermines the classical and digital libertarian defence for the need for private 
ownership to nurture and safeguard our sense of independence and freedom. Instead, marketing systems 
of enclosure that operate through precarious possession as we have shown, supplant independence and 
freedom, with ever growing dependence and diminution of personal autonomy.  Consumers in such 
systems of enclosure are best described as renters, in that, thinking alongside de Certeau (1984, p. 33), 
they only have transient rights to operate resources furnished by capitalism without real ownership. This 
creates a relationship of unbalanced dependency. The ultimate owners and arbitrators are the technologies 
of enclosure themselves- the firms providing access and hosting digital objects, who collectively produce, 
returning to de Certeau (1984, p. 40), a ‘system too vast to be able to fix them [renters] in one place, too 
constraining for them [renters] ever to be able to escape’.  So here, while opportunities and mechanisms 
to access and possess digital objects are vast, they also pin down renters to relationships of dependency 
that are not easily extricated. Consumers as renters cannot escape because having invested their 
psychological and financial resources in singularising digital objects into meaningful possessions, the 
costs of leaving are too high. Renting becomes a means of enclosure, because it is a precarious way of 
life, defined by uncertainty, dependency and reduced freedom. The idea that everything can be had, but 
not owned, is disingenuous in that nothing is ever had, only temporary access.  
Conclusion  
 
Marketing technologies – and more broadly marketing as technology – pursue the enclosure of the 
consumer subject (with Lazzarato, via the production of capital-worlds where specific consumer 
subjectivities are made possible) and of the commons (via the innovation of capitalist commons [see 
Zwick and Bradshaw, 2016] that permit the production and exploitation of collective productivity). What 
makes this marketing project so insidious is that at the same time that marketing (as) technology attempts 
to enclose its aspiration appears to be democratic: democratising access to good and services via digital 
possessions and sharing, democratising innovation and communication via brand communities and 
democratising information via Google and Big Data. The democratising discourse functions here 
ideologically because it allows marketers to resolve a key contradiction of marketing specific to 
participatory media: how to continue to control consumers in the age of democratisation, empowerment 
and participation.  
 
Today, even digital possessions are becoming technologies of enclosure. Via the notion of entanglement 
and renting, we suggest that the digital never provides real ownership and the sort of freedom authentic 
possession can provide from power. Rather, digital possessions are always precarious and unstable. The 
possession remains meaningful only for as long as the “owner” of the possession also is its “user”. 
Therefore, ever more entanglement with the object does not create possession and ownership but merely 
the right to its continuous use. In the age of biopolitical marketing, it is the job of marketers to ensure that 
this distinction disappears. 
 
Is the insidious assimilation of revolutionary concepts – participation, empowerment, autonomy, 
democratic determination – not the perfect expression of the cultural logic of capitalism? Instead of 
pushing the consumer to accept a brand’s version of the world, which can only lead to resistance and 
rejection of the message as the message of capital, the brand provides the context for what is then 
celebrated as the moment of “consumer empowerment”, when the consumer decides for herself that she 
really wants the brand and wanted it all along. But we should be very clear that this project of so-called 
consumer empowerment and consumer sovereignty gets consumers to the same place they were always 
already going to be. Therefore, in the age of biopolitical marketing, analyses of consumer empowerment 
fail unless they realize the concept’s ideological function in marketing practice. 
 
 
Unlike the corporate persuaders of the 20th century, digital and social media marketers no longer aspire to 
command consumers to consume. These new marketers wish to unify marketing, community, 
conversation and the general work of making a life for oneself. There is no more separation between what 
the marketer wants and what the consumer wants. This is the credo of biopolitical marketing: in a world 
of total enclosure of consumers and the commons, marketers and consumers become one. Marketers want 
what consumers want and vice versa. Everyone is in this together, not on two different sides of an 
anachronistic struggle but participating on the same side in the making of worlds. The contradictions 
brought about by the increasing interaction of marketing and technology abound and any comprehensive 
analysis of marketing technologies in communicative capitalism has to take these contradictions into 
account. 
After all, this symbiosis of marketer and consumer can never really hold. The consumer will always be 
the ‘other’ of marketing and the job of marketing can best be described as a process of constant and 
incessant identification and appropriation of a noncommodified ‘other’. This fundamental tension will not 
go away but the technologies of identification and appropriation are constantly changing. In the era of 
what Zuboff (2015) calls Surveillance Capitalism, networked commercial reconnaissance has become a 
totalizing reality. To put it in the language of biopolitical marketing, surveillance capitalism is the latest 
stage in a continuous dialectic of marketing forever forced to oscillate between a relentless need for more 
and better “othering” and a desire to co-create worlds and “become one” with the other. We suggest that 
technology-enabled marketing techniques and tools therefore will always be measured against their ability 
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